Information from The US 'Army Logistician', Bulletin of US Army Logistics (1)

The 8th Transportation Group arrived in Vietnam in October 1966 and immediately began daily operations out of the coastal city of Qui Nhon to support tactical units in northern II Corps (see map, page 30). Each month the truckers delivered over 90,000 tons of ammunition, building materials, fuel, and other supplies. Convoys sometimes contained more than 200 vehicles, occupying almost 10 miles of highway. Trips were made north to Bong Son and south to Tuy Hoa on Route 1, and west on Route 19 to An Khe and Pleiku. The latter journey was the longest line-haul route in Vietnam, more than 200 miles roundtrip.

Route 19 was also one of the more difficult and dangerous roads traveled by 8th Group truckers. The highway began near Qui Nhon and wound its way westward through two treacherous mountain passes. It was only partially paved, had little or no shoulder, and was filled with potholes. Sniping and mining incidents were frequent. The enemy made a determined effort to destroy the route's many bridges-an average of one every 3 miles.

By the end of Summer 1967, the enemy activity along Route 19 had increased dramatically. Colonel Joe 0. Bellino, then commander of 8th Group, commented that in World War II and Korea transportation units had operated over mined roads, received sniper fire, and been at-tacked. "But," he said, "our convoys get one form or another of it damn near every day." The graveled section of road between An Khe and the base of the Mang Giang Pass became the site of so many attacks that the truckers nicknamed the area "Ambush Alley."

The degree of convoy protection on Route 19 left much to be desired. Although military police units were usually able to provide route security in other areas of Vietnam, they had insufficient troops and equipment to cope with the ferocity of enemy attacks on 8th Group convoys. Further-more, tactical units operating near the highway could provide escort protection only where the road passed through their area of control.

Despite the increasing number of enemy attacks, the truckers of 8th Group continued to remain roadbound, 17 to 20 hours a day, 7 days a week. Sniping and mining incidents took their toll, but it was the highway ambush that presented the most danger. Enemy detonated mines would suddenly disable the machine guns, grenades, and small arms to destroy vehicles in the "kill zone." These zones could stretch from 100 yards to almost a mile in length, depending on the number of enemy troops involved. The attacks lasted only 15 to 20 minutes, giving the enemy time to hit and run before tactical reinforcements arrived.

September 2, 1967, marked the beginning of an all-out effort by the enemy to close Route 19. On that day, the 8th Group convoy was savagely at-tacked in "Ambush Alley" as the column was re-turning from Pleiku with empty trucks. Seven drivers were killed, 17 were wounded, and over 30 vehicles were damaged or destroyed. This was the worst attack on an 8th Group convoy since its arrival in Vietnam a year earlier. It was painfully obvious that the convoys had to have better defense.

As a result of the September ambush, 8th Group instituted what became known as the "hardened-convoy" concept. This was simply an order of march incorporating task vehicles, communications jeeps, and "guntrucks." The guntrucks were 2 1/2-ton cargo vehicles that had been removed from line-haul operations and outfitted with sand-bags on the floors, beds, and sides for protection.

A crew consisting of a driver, two M-60 machine gunners, and a non-commissioned officer in charge was assigned to each hardened security truck. The new concept called for the guntrucks to provide a rapid, retaliatory saturation fire within the critical first 3 minutes of an enemy attack.

During ambushes, drivers of supply vehicles tried to get out of the kill zone as quickly as possible. For the crew of the guntrucks, however, the opposite was true. As soon as the enemy launched his attack against a convoy, the guntrucks were to drive immediately into the kill zone to protect disabled vehicles by providing them fire support.

Because of the growing enemy activity in the highlands, the number of trucks in an individual convoy had been reduced. Columns contained fewer than 100 vehicles in march units of 10 to 20 trucks each. More and more guntrucks were out-fitted until there was an average of one security vehicle for every 10 task vehicles.

After a few weeks of experimentation, it became apparent that the sandbags on a guntruck absorbed too much water from the frequent rains, in-creasing the weight of the vehicle and making it sluggish and difficult to manoeuvre. The problem was alleviated when a young warrant officer of the 8th Group discovered several sheets of steel plate in a local salvage yard and had them welded to a 2 1/2-ton cargo truck-giving 8th Group its first armor-plated guntruck. Armor soon replaced sandbags on the security vehicles, and by October the unique battlewagons were a common sight along Route 19.

The typical guntruck was armor-plated on the front, rear, and sides. The cab floor and bed were also armored for protection against mines. Pedestal mounts for the M60 machine guns were in-stalled in the bed, and sections of the side plate directly in front of each gun were cut down several inches to provide a field of fire. In addition, a grenadier, armed with the M79 grenade launcher, was added to the crew.

Another change within the hardened convoy concept was that 8th Group did not confine the guntrucks to one location in the convoy but allowed them to vary their positions daily to prevent the enemy from detecting a pattern.

On the morning of November 24, 1967, the gun-trucks got their first real chance to prove their effectiveness. As the daily convoy was approaching "Ambush Alley," the column was suddenly at-tacked by a North Vietnamese or Viet Cong rifle company. Rockets struck the first vehicle in the kill zone, igniting loads of artillery ammunition and blocking the road. As the enemy soldiers at tempted to overrun the stalled vehicles, the gun trucks entered the ambush area to do battle.

After about 20 minutes, the immense firepower of the guntrucks prevailed and the enemy began to withdraw. Amidst the twisted and smoking wreck age of cargo vehicles lay the bodies of 41 enemy soldiers. Four others had been wounded and captured. In the 300 meter kill zone of the convoy,3 were killed, 17 were wounded, and 10 vehicles had been damaged or destroyed, including 4 of the guntrucks engaged. In an after-action report, the 8th Group commander reported that "the quick reaction and firepower of this convoy were the only factors that prevented this ambush from being a success."

As the ambushes continued, so did the evolutionary process of guntruck design and employment. Design and armament were restricted on by the materials available and the imagination transportation unit personnel.

One major change in the guntruck concept that the 2 1/2 ton truck was phased out as the mainstay of route security because it was too light to manoeuvre with the added weight of armour and weapons. Instead, the 5-ton cargo truck began to replace the "deuce-and-a-half" as a convoy escort vehicle.

Another change was the modification of the armour on some guntrucks into "box" structures in the beds. Within this box were kept weapons, tools, extra wheels and tires, water and oil, and a fire extinguisher. Thus, the guntrucks served not only as security vehicles but also as maintenance trucks, capable of protecting and restarting disabled vehicles on potentially dangerous sections of highway.

As a protection against enemy rockets, double walls of steel plate were attached to some gun-trucks. The theory was that incoming rockets would be detonated on contact with the outer wall. Shrapnel would then bounce harmlessly off the inner wall, never reaching the crew.

Many of the guntrucks replaced the M60 machine gun with .50-caliber machine guns, either alone or in multiple mounts. One innovation was the "quad-fifty." This weapon consisted of four electronically synchronized .50-caliber machine guns mounted in the bed of a 2 1/2-ton truck. At one time, 8th Group was employing seven of these weapons.

 

One Gun Truck crewman would receive the Congressional Medal of Honour, the highest US medal.

"Larry Dahl distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity while serving as a machine gunner on a gun truck near An Khe, Binh Dinh Province. The gun truck in which Spc. Dahl was riding was sent with 2 other gun trucks to assist in the defense of a convoy that had been ambushed by an enemy force. The gun trucks entered the battle zone and engaged the attacking enemy troops with a heavy volume of machine gun fire, causing a large number of casualties. After a brief period of intense fighting the attack subsided. As the gun trucks were preparing to return to their normal escort duties, an enemy hand grenade was thrown into the truck in which Spc. Dahl was riding. Instantly realizing the great danger, Spc. Dahl called a warning to his companions and threw himself directly onto the grenade. Through his indomitable courage, complete disregard for his safety, and profound concern for his fellow soldiers, Spc. Dahl saved the lives of the other members of the truck crew while sacrificing his own. Sp4c. Dahl's conspicuous gallantry, extraordinary heroism, and intrepidity at the cost of his life, above and beyond the call of duty, are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit on himself, his unit and the U.S. Army." (4)